TEXTO DE APOIO (clique para abrir / fechar)
Para responder às questões de números 11 a 15, considere o texto a seguir.
Text CB1A2
Currently, the Digital Euro has not been launched — though there are signs that a launch may be coming sooner rather than later. By October 2025, the ECB (European Central Bank) has indicated a second phase of the preparation for the Digital Euro. By then, the ECB will have prepared an outreach plan, procurement standards, and technology providers.
The Digital Euro has potential downsides, many of them echoed in the other launches of central bank digital currencies. For example, the central bank will become a technology company focused on procurement with central points of failure. This was a breeding ground for corruption for the bureaucrat fortunate enough to make these technical choices in China.
While the Digital Euro is slated to “coexist” with cash, this also comes when EU (European Union) nations are voting on ending end-to-end encryption (a critical digital privacy tool) and have started to restrict cash with limits being placed on how much you can spend in cash to accelerate its slow demise.
User privacy is said to be the ECB’s “chief concern” as it has been designing the central bank’s digital currency. Certainly, the ECB is aware of public perception that has negative surveillance, control, and privacy implications in mind. The ECB has been at pains to say that the Digital Euro will “coexist” with cash and that unlike the e-CNY (China’s central bank digital coin) it will not be tied to a “social credit” score or place limits on how money is spent.
A big part of the ECB’s drive towards the Digital Euro is to compete and pry Europeans away from Bitcoin, cryptocurrencies, and “stablecoins”.
Central bank digital currencies are a direct liability of the central bank. Since the central bank has the power to issue currency, this means that the central bank can essentially create “digital euros” if it wishes to. The architecture and data within a central bank digital currency are usually built completely by the central bank supported by private vendors of its choice. In China, the central bank has turned away from a distributed ledger technology to a centralized data store, in which the technical details are pretty scant. Hence, the central bank controls everything, and the system has no external access.
Disponível em: www.forbes.com/sites
QUESTÃO
It is correct to conclude from the fourth paragraph of text CB1A2 that, in the implementation of the Digital Euro,
social credit and ledger technology prevents privacy issues.
the ECB will follow the Chinese model and its privacy policy.
end-to-end cryptography will guarantee privacy.
privacy is a direct liability of the central bank.
the public is worried about possible adverse effects regarding privacy.
🔐 Gabarito (clique para revelar)
🧭 1️⃣ Leitura orientada
A leitura deve focar na expressão “public perception” e nas palavras negative surveillance, control, and privacy implications, que revelam a reação da sociedade ao projeto.
📝 2️⃣ Análise técnica das alternativas
(A) ❌
Incorreta. O texto menciona o modelo chinês apenas para diferenciá-lo,
não para afirmar que ele resolve problemas de privacidade.
(B) ❌
Incorreta. O ECB explicitamente afirma que não seguirá o modelo chinês.
(C) ❌
Incorreta. O texto menciona o debate sobre criptografia,
mas não afirma garantia de privacidade.
(D) ❌
Incorreta. Direct liability aparece em outro parágrafo,
relacionada à moeda, não à privacidade.
(E) ✅
Correta. O texto afirma que o ECB está consciente da
percepção pública negativa,
o que indica preocupação social com possíveis impactos adversos à privacidade.
⚠️ 3️⃣ Armadilhas clássicas da CESPE/CEBRASPE
A banca explora inferência indireta: o texto não diz “o público está preocupado” de forma literal, mas isso é deduzido pela expressão public perception.
🧠 4️⃣ Resumo B3GE™ Master
✔ O ECB reconhece receios sociais.
✔ Há temor de vigilância e perda de privacidade.
✔ Inferência típica da CESPE.
🔎 Gabarito confirmado: (E)